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I. LEGAL GUIDELINES GOVERNING ALLOCATION OF REVENUE
REQUIREMENT
The standard governing the Minnesota Public Utilities Com-
mission in its allocation of rates between electric and natural gas
utility customer classes is set forth in Minnesota Statutes, section
216B.03:
Every rate made, demanded, or received by any public util-
ity, or by any two or more public utilities jointly, shall be just
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and reasonable. Rates shall not be unreasonably preferential,
unreasonably prejudicial or discriminatory, but shall be suffi-
cient, equitable and consistent in application to a class of con-
sumers. Any doubt as to reasonableness should be resolved in
favor of the consumer.'
The commission is similarly responsible for determining "fair and
reasonable" charges for intrastate telephone service.
2
The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
above statutory language as conferring upon the commission
broad legislative powers in the area of rate design.3 The rationale
for these decisions is perhaps best stated in St. Paul Area Chamber of
Commerce v. Minnesota Public Service Commission :
4
The process of establishing rate allocations among diverse con-
sumer classes is one requiring both technical expertise on the
one hand and a careful balancing of many complementary and
competing interests on the other. . . We believe it to be in
the public interest, which the legislature was surely intending
to serve in the broadest sense by establishing the Public Service
Commission, that the commission be allowed within the
bounds of reasonableness to consider both facts within its ex-
pertise and facts of common knowledge in arriving at its deci-
sions in the ratemaking area.
5
The following sections analyze the manner in which the com-
mission has carried out its broad legislative mandate in the area of
rate design, and suggest an analytical framework to foster a more
consistent and appropriate approach.
II. FACTORS INVOLVED IN ALLOCATION OF REVENUE
REQUIREMENT
A. In General
As noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court accords the
commission broad leeway in determining whether rates are "suffi-
cient, equitable, and consistent" for a particular customer class,
while not "unreasonably preferential, unreasonably prejudicial or
1. MINN. STAT. § 216B.03 (1982).
2. Id § 237.06 (1982).
3. See Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 302 N.W.2d 5, 12
(Minn. 1980); St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
312 Minn. 250, 254-55, 251 N.W.2d 350, 354 (1977); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State,
299 Minn. 1, 28, 216 N.W.2d 841, 857 (1974).
4. 312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977).
5. Id at 255, 251 N.W.2d at 354 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 8
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discriminatory" as compared with rates for other customer classes.
Implicit in these statutory and judicial guidelines is the under-
standing that the commission, in setting rates, must keep in mind
such varying objectives as economic efficiency, equity, and fair-
ness. The court has stressed the commission's implied authority to
consider not only costs, but also other factors of importance to the
utility, its customers, and the community at large, such as, the pre-
vention of environmental pollution and the conservation of energy
resources.
6
Despite the seeming variety of approaches a utility might use in
proposing and the commission might choose in setting rates, most
utility filings contain a common starting point. That common ap-
proach is to prepare a cost study assigning costs by type and func-
tion to the various customer classes. Thus, we need to analyze the
factors involved in these class-cost-of-service studies before turning
to other factors which are or may be considered.
B. Accounting Cost
What does a cost study consist of? To take the example of an
electric utility, first, the company chooses a test year and looks at
all costs associated with its booked investment in plant and ex-
penses for that year. It then makes a first rough cut in which costs
are broken down into customer, capacity or demand, and energy
components. These classifications relate, respectively, to costs in-
volved in the delivery, availability, and usage of energy.
7
The second cut in a cost study is functionalization of costs. To
continue the example of an electric utility, these functions, which
must be assigned on the basis of engineering studies, include the
costs of producing, transmitting, and distributing electricity, and
of providing service to electric customers independent of the
amount of service demanded in a particular time period.
Several things become apparent from this very cursory explana-
tion of the process of developing cost studies. The first is that enor-
6. See id at 255-56, 251 N.W.2d at 354.
7. These classifications also relate, in a rough way, to the economist's concepts of
fixed and variable costs. Thus, customer costs include those fixed in both the long and
short terms; capacity costs tend to be fixed over the short term but not the long term; and
energy costs vary in the short and long terms. In practice, however, these classifications
are not rigid. For example, the cost of a new electric plant may be partially allocated to
the energy component as well as to capacity charges, on the theory that the new plant will
be more efficient in fuel usage and thus save energy, as well as making more electricity
available to customers.
19821
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mous resources are involved in preparing a cost study, including
the compilation of load research data, the analysis of such data,
and engineering studies to classify various plant and other capital
investment. For this reason, utilities often support all or part of
their rate increase filings on the basis of earlier cost studies up-
dated insofar as possible to reflect recent changes.
A second point becomes apparent. Neither the commission nor
other intervenors are likely to have the resources to do much more
than spot check cost studies prepared by the utilities, especially
when operating under rigid time constraints for commission issu-
ance of decisions on rate change applications.
Finally, it is apparent that the historic accounting (embedded)
costs traditionally considered by utilities in preparing cost studies
may or may not bear any relationship to the actual, current costs
of serving particular classes of customers. The last point will be
elucidated in the next subsection.
C Economic Cost
As previously noted, most cost studies presented to the commis-
sion by Minnesota utilities involve the allocation of historic or em-
bedded costs among various customer classes. Economic theory,
on the other hand, holds that the goal of efficient allocation of
resources is best served when rates are set for each class in some
reasonable relationship to the "marginal" rather than the embed-
ded costs of serving each customer class.
A thorough examination of the theoretical basis for allocation of
customer class revenue requirement responsibility on the basis of
marginal costs exceeds the scope of this paper. What is of greater
importance for the present is that Congress has implicitly recog-
nized the value of setting rates in accordance with criteria giving
greater attention to marginal rather than to embedded costs of
serving various customer classes. The "cost of service" standard of
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) com-
pels state commissions to determine, to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, costs of serving customers which "permit identification of
differences in cost-incurrence attributable to differences in cus-
tomer, demand, and energy components of cost," including "the
extent to which total costs to an electric utility are likely to change
if additional capacity is added to meet peak demand relative to
base demand and additional kilowatt-hours of electric energy are
[Vol. 8
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delivered to electric consumers."" Thus, federal law has compelled
state commissions, including Minnesota's, to consider at least one
set of factors, marginal cost factors, not present in traditional class-
cost-of-service studies.
D. Economic Externaities
Another group of cost factors the commission may consider, but
which are inherently outside the scope of any kind of formal cost
study, are economic externalities. Economic externalities may be
defined as interactions among economic agents not adequately re-
flected in markets. Alternatively, they may be defined according
to their specific effects, as in the following definition by Professor
Paul A. Samuelson in his classic textbook Economics:9
An "external economy" is defined as a favorable efct on one
or more persons that emanates from the action of a different
person or firm; it shifts the cost or utility curve of each person it
helps, and such an extemally caused shift should be distin-
guished from any internal movement along the affected individ-
ual's own cost curve.
An "external diseconomy" is defined in the same way, except
that it refers to external harm that is done to others. The case
where expansion of fishing by others in limited waters serves to
shift up each boat's cost curves would be an example of an ex-
ternal diseconomy; another case would be one where each
man's haste to drill for oil near his neighbors' boundaries lowers
the amount of oil ever recovered.' 0
A good example of the working of external economies may be
seen in the area of basic telephone service. In analyzing this area,
the commission often uses the concept of "value of service" to jus-
tify pricing basic residential telephone service below the costs asso-
ciated with such service (as those costs are reflected in embedded
cost studies prepared by the telephone companies) on the basis
that telephone service is of greater "value" to business than to resi-
dential customers. An alternative analysis of this question, how-
ever, could justify a subsidy for basic residential service in terms of
external economies associated with universal telephone service.
Clearly, the value of a telephone line in some sense relates to the
number of other lines that can be reached via the telephone sys-
8. Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 2625 (Supp.
V 1981).
9. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1973).
10. Id at 474.
1982]
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tem. Therefore, if basic service is priced at a level where almost
everyone can afford it, the presence of these additional lines on the
network constitutes an "external economy" associated with a "sub-
sidy" to universal telephone service.
The practical application is that because of external economies
of this sort, business telephone customers might on average actu-
ally benefit from paying a higher portion of the telephone com-
pany's overall revenue requirement. This would occur if the value
of telephone service increases more than the increase in costs, and
thus lowers the true unit costs for business customers.
Economic diseconomies also occur. One example of this is the
well-known "peak-load" problem. These external diseconomies
also can be addressed by proper use of the rate structure.
The Minnesota commission recognized one of these external dis-
economies in Minnesota Power & Lzght Co. " I In that case, the com-
mission expressly based its adoption of the company's proposed
class revenue allocations upon the conclusion that the large power
(taconite) class of customers clearly imposed "a higher relative risk
on MP&L's system than do other customer classes."' 2 Since
MP&L paid a higher return on its equity capital and borrowings
because of the predominance among its customers of taconite com-
panies whose unstable electricity consumption resulted in uneven
contributions to MP&L earnings, the commission felt it fair to as-
sess a greater share of these capital costs to the class of taconite
customers whose presence caused those added costs.
E Non-Cost Factors
In addition to the embedded, marginal, and external cost fac-
tors, the commission is frequently urged to take into account fac-
tors that are unrelated to costs. Traditionally the commission
takes non-cost factors into account in setting and approving rate
structures. For example, in Northern States Power Co. ,'3 the commis-
sion discussed this matter as follows:
[T]he Commission believes that other factors such as value of
service, billing impact, ability to pass on the increases, and abil-
ity to write off electric costs on taxes must be taken into ac-
count. The Commission is fully aware that these factors are not
easily quantified and subject to substantial judgment; however,
11. Docket No. E-015/GR-80-76 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan. 30, 1981).
12. Id at 40.
13. Docket No. E-002/GR-76-934 (Minn. P.S.C. Mar. 2, 1977).
[Vol. 8
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this does not mean they are without importance. It does mean
that the Commission is required to exercise extreme care and
caution in weighing these factors in its deliberations.1
4
In upholding the commission's power to take such noncost fac-
tors into account, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in St. Paul Area
Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Public Service Commission ,15 agreed
with the reasoning expressed in a United States Supreme Court
opinion that the ratemaking responsibilities of a utility regulatory
commission "necessarily oblige it to give continuing attention to
values that may be reflected only imperfectly by producers' costs; a
regulatory method that excluded as immaterial all but current or
projected costs could not properly serve the consumer interest
placed under the Commission's protection."' 6  The Minnesota
Supreme Court went on to hold that when the commission acts in
a legislative capacity, as it does when allocating revenue require-
ments among customer classes, and "balanc[es] both cost and
noncost factors in making choices among public policy alterna-
tives, its decisions will be upheld unless shown to be in excess of
statutory authority or resulting in unjust, unreasonable or discrim-
inatory rates by clear and convincing evidence."' 7 In enacting
PURPA, Congress similarly has recognized that non-cost factors
may at times be appropriate, and in fact mandated consideration
of "lifeline" provisions in electric rate schedules to cover essential
human needs.'8
III. ROLE OF COST STUDIES IN THE COMMISSION'S RATE
SETTING PROCESS
Having identified the various types of factors that can be taken
into account by the commission, we now turn to an analysis of
what types of costs are actually presented in cost studies prepared
by utilities. As previously noted, cost studies prepared by the util-
ity companies traditionally reflect little more than historic ac-
counting costs after allocation according to often outdated
engineering studies. It is important to reiterate in this context the
unique control the company exerts over such cost studies in light
14. Id at 47.
15. 312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977).
16. Id at 257, 251 N.W.2d at 355, quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747, 815 (1968).
17. Id at 262, 251 N.W.2d at 358.
18. Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 2625 (Supp.
V 1981).
1982]
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of the immense difficulties faced by the commission's staff or inter-
venors in reviewing even parts of such studies.
This pattern certainly conflicts with that envisioned by the legis-
lature and courts. In St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota
Pubhc Service Commission ,19 the Minnesota court presumed "that the
members of the commission itself, with their supporting staff, have
in their grasp practical knowledge in the field of utilities regulation
not possessed by either the courts or laymen in general. ' 20 Such a
presumption would be unwarranted if the commission viewed its
role as limited to review of companies' cost studies, which would
then be blindly ratified as part of an approved rate structure.
The difficulties for the commission and its staff in evaluating
and challenging the foundations of cost studies are shared by inter-
venors, especially intervenors with limited financial and technical
resources. Even intervenors assisted by high-fee expert witnesses
generally find substantial difficulty in challenging more than se-
lected elements of companies' cost studies. The problems for inter-
venors without access to experts or technical staff are magnified,
especially to the extent that the commission fails to award inter-
venor compensation as it has already refused to do in telephone
cases.2'
These problems, of course, would not be as serious if the compa-
nies' cost studies were truly objective, comprehensive, and reflec-
tive of current incremental costs of serving various customer
classes. In fact, however, the commission has recognized the arbi-
trariness of all cost studies. In its order in Minnesota Power & Light
Co. ,22 the commission, in discussing the various cost studies pro-
posed by the parties, noted: "The very diversity of results that
those studies are able to produce indicates to the Commission that
cost analysis is far from an exact science. Much still depends upon
the analyst devising and performing a study, and any study's re-
sults may be easily altered by that analyst's choices. ' 23
Despite this admission, the commission continues to demand
that intervenors present formal, expensive cost studies in order to
be heard on common-sense proposals clearly within the commis-
sion's expertise and power to evaluate without unnecessary studies.
19. 312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977).
20. Id at 255, 251 N.W.2d at 354.
21. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Feb.
5, 1982) (Order Denying Intervenor Compensation).
22. Docket No. E-015/GR-80-76 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan. 30, 1981).
23. Id at 45.
[Vol. 8
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The commission accorded the proposals of the United Handi-
capped Federation in Northern States Power Co. 24 this burdensome
treatment .
25
Similarly, in Northwestem Bell Telephone Co. ,26 the commission
heard the testimony of a public school accountant and financial
expert with more than twenty years of practical experience in pub-
lic school administration. Despite that witness's quantification of
the common-sense notion that school telephone usage is less than
that of the average business customer because of the limited
number of days per year and hours per day that schools are in
session, the commission found it "inappropriate to implement a
reduced school rate on the basis of the record of this proceeding. '27
Presumably, the intervenor sponsoring such testimony would have
had to have retained an expert at costs upwards of $10,000 to for-
mally analyze this proposition. The next section of this paper
questions the appropriateness of such a requirement.
IV. TOWARD A MORE WORKABLE REGULATORY MODEL
It is submitted that, as the commission's work load increases rel-
ative to its own resources, the results of cost studies filed by compa-
nies receive increasingly inordinate deference. Conversely, the
underlying goals of equity, efficiency, fairness, and other public
policy objectives that should be the focus rather than an occasional
peripheral subject of commission analysis obtain inadequate atten-
tion. Cost of service as reflected in a particular cost-of-service
study may, of course, afford some useful information, but should
only be one factor in achieving appropriate overall regulatory
objectives. Reconsideration of objectives may be viewed as espe-
cially crucial in light of recently published comparisons of Minne-
sota rate structures to those in other states. Using data from Energy
User News,28 and employing the industrial electric rate as a base
for comparing the rates to commercial and residential rates, we see
the following relationships between these rates in six selected cities:
24. Docket No. E-002/GR-80-316 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 30, 1981).
25. Id at 43-44.
26. Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29, 1981).
27. Id at 78.
28. Mar. 1, 1982, at 6. Mr. Wayne Schmidt, an analyst with the Residential Utility
Consumer Unit, Minnesota Office of Consumer Services, extrapolated the table provided
in the text from price data for consumer classes for particular cities.
1982]
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Industrial Commercial Residential
Houston 1.00 1.20 1.19
Boston 1.00 1.31 1.25
Cleveland 1.00 1.28 1.28
Philadelphia 1.00 1.55 1.32
Denver 1.00 1.48 1.46
Minneapolis 1.00 1.32 1.57
The table indicates that the normal pattern of electric rates in
these communities appears to be lower rates for industrial use and
roughly comparable rates for commercial and residential use. The
exceptions to this pattern are in Philadelphia, where commercial
users carry the heaviest relative load, and Minneapolis, where
residential customers suffer a similar burden. To the extent that
the methodology employed in setting electric rates for Northern
States Power's Minneapolis customers is not reexamined, this
situation will continue even though no readily apparent
distinction between these cities in terms of electric usage
characteristics exists.
Failure to look to consistent regulatory objectives can also lead
to disparate rate relationships among otherwise comparable
utilities. Thus, we may see situations where business customers of
one telephone company pay rates double those of residential
customers, while in an adjacent exchange served by another
company the comparable ratio is more on the order of 1.5 to 1.
Another example in the telephone area may be seen in the
commission's pursuit of universal telephone service in setting basic
phone service rates, while not recognizing that for some customers,
especially in rural areas, high extended area service rates and the
absence of a "community calling plan" 29 or similar options may
undercut the universal service goal.
In the area of electric rate design, the commission may wish to
pursue the goal of energy conservation in an effort to avoid the
construction of expensive new generating capacity. At the same
time, the commission may order a utility to charge all its
residential customers a flat rate energy charge reflecting the
average cost of providing electric service to that class so that
customers who have invested in electric space heating do not pay
disproportionately greater costs for their above-average
29. Under "community calling plan" proposals, customers would be allowed a
certain number of toll-free calls each month to adjacent exchanges where their local
schools, local governmental bodies, and other services are located.
[Vol. 8
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consumption. Under such a rate structure, the commission will
not only be providing rate relief to those who already have electric
space heating, but also will encourage additional customers to
install energy-intensive space heating systems. This undercuts
energy conservation goals, a factor the commission should take
into account.
The fact that the commission generally faces several competing
rate design objectives underscores its need to keep all of these
objectives in focus for each type of utility and each individual case.
It also underscores the need to reject inappropriate rate design
objectives such as merely tracking the results of cost studies.
Allowing the company the opportunity to fully recover its costs is a
constitutionally compelled objective. Economic efficiency is
another valid objective. The use of cost studies in rate design,
however, is merely one possible means to achieve certain rate
design objectives and not an objective in itself.
In concluding this section, one commonly made argument must
be addressed. That is the suggestion that embedded cost studies
are somewhat more objective and less arbitrary than marginal cost
studies or other forms of analysis. Perhaps the best recent
refutation of this contention may be found in the prefiled
testimony of Dr. Frederick Wells in Northern States Power Co. 30 Dr.
Wells notes the many different and widely disputed ways of
allocating embedded costs, as compared with general agreement
on at least the definition of marginal cost.
3 '
This is not to deny that marginal cost studies also harbor
elements of arbitrariness. It merely demonstrates that all cost
studies involve somewhat arbitrary decisions and should be viewed
as instructive starting points rather than as presumptive
determinants of ultimate rate structures. The legislature, in
setting up the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, sought to
vest the rate-setting process in the hands of a broadly
representative group of citizens whose primary collective attribute
is common sense. The commission should not cower in the shadow
of cost studies, but should open-mindedly evaluate as broad as
possible a range of proposals from public and private intervenors
in terms of the underlying principles their specific proposals
represent without undue attention to their mathematical content.
30. Docket No. E-002/GR-80-316 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 30, 1981).
31. Id at 69-71.
1982]
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To do otherwise would be to abandon to the technocrats the most
important aspect of the commission's statutory mandate.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has not been to suggest
that the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission has in any way
failed to diligently carry out its important statutory responsibili-
ties. The hope is, rather, that the commission will reconsider its
occasional tendency to place undue weight on cost studies submit-
ted by utilities in connection with filings. The commission must
recognize that such studies involve only estimates. All parties to
proceedings should be encouraged to submit alternatives, such as
marginal cost data, for determining fair charges for particular
services. Under such circumstances, data submitted by both the
utilities and intervenors can be used equally for the purpose it
should be: as a means to address the more fundamental objectives
of regulation. By encouraging as many proposals as possible, the
commission will obtain the input necessary to allow it to accom-
plish the task for which it is better equipped than any utility com-
pany: the balancing of the many important and often conflicting
public and private interests the legislature has given it the duty to
resolve.
[Vol. 8
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